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“I Know It When I See It”: 







The Supreme Court’s definition of obscenity, even with many of the landmark decisions, 
remains somewhat ambiguous. The 1800s unfolded the first obscenity cases in the nation brought 
before the judiciary; the cases concerned materials believed to violate society’s values on 
propriety and morality. The Supreme Court’s pursuit in defining obscenity uncovered a series of 
legal tests to serve as guidelines for the community and lower courts. Still, the establishment of 
legal tests did not guarantee a strict definition; the last of these tests established by the Supreme 
Court, the Miller Test (1973), is still subjective and ambiguous. Since settling with the Miller 
Test, the Supreme Court has not established any other national standards. Justice Stewart 
reflected the Court’s attitude in his dissent for Jacobellis v. Ohio, stating his famous line, “I 
know it when I see it,” suggesting the existing struggle in the Court to define legal parameters, as 
one definition of obscenity cannot effectively be applied to every case nor can it stand the test of 
time. The evolution of societal values throughout the years, from the 1800s to the 1900s, created 
this difficulty that challenged the Supreme Court’s consistency. The 1960s introduced a sexual 
revolution, which triggered a reaction from the Courts in an attempt to meet the demands of 
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society’s evolving values on morality. The cases brought before the Supreme Court consistently 
reflected the change in societal values: prior to the sexual revolution, the Court—always in 
concurrence with society—deemed the challenged materials brought to them as obscene. 
Following the sexual revolution, as society became more accepting, the Court deemed many of 
the challenged materials not obscene. The concern within the spread of obscenity cases between 
the 1800s and 1900s evolved accordingly to society’s values on morality, thus due to the change 
in attitude and behavior, especially the growing acceptance of sensuality among Americans, the 
Supreme Court had to adapt their definition of obscenity in parallel to the demands of society. 
The emergence of the first obscenity cases, Rosen v. United States (1896) prompted the 
integration of an English case into the Supreme Court. Without having established a legal test 
nor definition, the Court adopted the Hicklin Test from an English case, Regina v. Hicklin 
(1868), ruling obscenity as “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to 
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose 
hands a publication of this sort may fall.”1 Moreover, the Hicklin Test rejected the idea that the 
subject matter must be taken as a whole, but rather argued the opposite: “It is not necessary to 
show that a publication is obscene on every page. A publication may be obscene because part of 
it is obscene.”2 Rosen, as the defendant, pleaded not guilty after facing charges for depositing 
obscene materials in the mail, in defense that the Rosen himself had no prior knowledge of the 
subject matter to be obscene. The Supreme Court’s prosecution of Rosen v. United States (1896), 
taking the Hicklin Test as its basis, set the precedent in justifying future prosecutions that 
reflected the societal values of the 19th century. Without having mentioned the First Amendment 
 
1 J. E. Hall Williams, “Obscenity in Modern English Law,” Law and Contemporary Problems 20, no. 4 
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in the opinion of the Court, the Judicial Branch eschewed obscenity, establishing that the First 
Amendment does not constitutionally protect obscenity as freedom of expression nor of speech 
and press–clarified later in Roth v. United States (1957). Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of 
the Court, acknowledging “every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, 
writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character...are hereby declared to be 
nonmailable matter, and shall not be conveyed in the mails, nor delivered from any post office 
nor by any letter carrier; and any person who shall knowingly deposit, or cause to be deposited, 
for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be non-mailable matter...shall be 
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.3 The 19th century cases saw prosecutions in favor of societal 
values on morality with the Court mainly engaging with finding the challenged materials 
obscene and prohibiting the dissemination of these materials. Though there was no basis except 
for the Hicklin Test itself adopted from the United Kingdom, the 19th century values dictated the 
decisions of the judiciary. 
 In 1957, the Supreme Court landed its first landmark decision in Roth v. United States 
(1957). Combining both Roth v. United States (1957) and Alberts v. California (1957), the Court 
established what qualifies a First Amendment protection. Roth and Alberts were both guilty of 
mailing obscene materials in violation of the federal obscenity statute; both defendants argued 
that government prohibition of dissemination of obscene materials impinged the First 
Amendment provision of freedom of expression and press. Though Rosen v. United States 
(1896) steered clear of mentioning the First Amendment altogether, Roth v. United States (1957) 
formally established obscenity is not an area protected by the First Amendment, paving the way 
for the Court to explicitly determine which category of expression warranted First Amendment 
 
3 Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896). 
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protection, and specifically what constituted obscene materials. Behind the argument to place 
obscenity apart from First Amendment protection is a government that “has a significant interest 
in protecting minors and unwilling passerby from being exposed to obscene materials, that the 
government has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving societal mores and values, and 
lastly that obscenity ‘utterly lacks any redeeming social importance.’ The fundamental notion is 
that these interests outweigh any benefit (and indeed the argument that there is no benefit) that 
obscenity may have on society, and as such it is subject matter upon which regulation is 
important and proper.”4 
 A few years short of the start of the sexual revolution, societal values have evolved since 
Rosen v. United States (1896). The Court found that the Hicklin Test no longer fit the model 
standard of morality, as the test judges “obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the 
most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it 
must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press.”5 Roth v. 
United States (1957) is illustrative of the Court’s attempt to create a uniform national standard; 
the new parameters of obscenity then forms that: “For material to count as obscene ‘it must be 
established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeal to a prurient 
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community 
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is 
utterly without redeeming social value.’”6 The underlying significance in Roth’s ruling is the 
government guaranteeing First Amendment protection to materials with social value. A society 
 
4 Kamilah Mitchell, “Let’s Talk About Sex: How Societal Value Evolution Has Redefined Obscenity,” 
Pace Intellectual Property, Sports & Entertainment Law Forum 4, no.2 (Spring 2014): 517. 
 
5 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).  
 
6 Kent Greenawalt, “Obscenity,” in Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 99-123. 
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that was beginning to embrace the idea of the sexual revolution put the Supreme Court to its 
realization that “sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals 
with sex in a manner of prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific 
works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of 
speech and press...It is therefore vital that the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the 
protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner 
appealing to prurient interest.”7 In differing these two the Judicial Branch is symbolic to the 
progressive changes occurring in society. For decades, Roth’s parameters provided sufficiency to 
be the basis of future prosecutions for the judiciary. The sixty-year gap since Rosen v. United 
States (1896) allowed the justices a fresh rumination of society’s demands, thus by far eclipsing 
the standards found in the Hicklin Test.  
 Following the parameters constructed in Roth v. United States (1957), the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed them in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964). The states convicted Jacobellis for showing a 
movie the state allegedly deemed obscene. As the case was brought before the Court, the 
dispositive question “is whether the state courts properly found that the motion picture involved 
a French film called ‘Les Amants,’ was obscene and hence not entitled to the protection for free 
expression that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”8 The tripartite 
parameters in Roth recognized the social value in materials excluding it from being deemed 
obscene. Justice Brennan delivered the majority opinion of the Court: “We have viewed the film, 
in the light of the record made in the trial court, and we conclude that it is not obscene within the 
standards enunciated in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, which we reaffirm 
 
7 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).  
 
8 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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here.”9 However, the legacy of Jacobellis v. Ohio lies in Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion, 
acknowledging the struggle to have a precise definition for the First and Fourteenth Amendment. 
“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced 
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But 
I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”10 What 
Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964) presented is the significant reduction of government prohibition in 
monitoring obscenity. While the Hicklin Test would find the movie, “Les Amants” obscene, 
Roth’s jurisprudence deemed it otherwise. Just as society’s values dictated the course of action of 
the Court’s in Rosen v. United States (1896), the undeviating embrace of beliefs of the sexual 
revolution equally impacted the Courts in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964). 
To the extent that the First Amendment protects materials with social values, it also 
protects a citizen’s private pursuit of obscene materials–books or films. Possessing obscene film 
reels, which violated Georgia’s statute, brought Stanley’s litigation in Stanley v. Georgia (1969). 
Such litigation then aroused the dispositive question of whether or not Georgia law impinges on 
the First Amendment freedom of expression; put another way, “If the State can protect the body 
of a citizen, may it not, argues Georgia, protect his mind?”11 Stanley v. Georgia (1969) in 
specific will account for the rising leniency from the government, as the Court lessened 
obscenity prohibitions within every case heard. The mindset of the Court here exemplifies a 
society undergoing substantial change in norms and values. In the progress of resolving the case, 






11 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
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progeny certainly do mean that the First and Fourteenth Amendments recognize a valid 
governmental interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity. But the assertion of that interest 
cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections. Neither Roth nor any 
other decision of this Court reaches that far.”12 This statement conveys a subtle hint that Roth’s 
precedent is no longer adequate for a society that continues to evolve. For the first time did the 
Court explicate the importance of the First Amendment protection towards obscenity. “The 
Court now has distinguished that personal privacy is fundamental to a free society, and ruled that 
the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment prohibited anyone to be charged of privately 
possessing materials.”13 Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the First Amendment brought to 
light that “If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a 
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our 
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control 
men's minds.”14 Such a liberal decision tells us the impact of societal values on the Court–that 
jurisprudence on the topic of obscenity reflects the standards of society.  
The Supreme Court’s pursuit in defining obscenity apexed in 1973, when Miller v. 
California (1973) emerged before the Court. Miller v. California (1973) is significant because it 
serves as fundamental guidelines for obscenity cases up to the present day. Since Roth v. United 
States (1957), the Court did not change any of the established parameters, thus the creation of the 
Miller Test embraces the necessity of this change as society’s demands increase. Compared to 
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promotes and accepts sexual freedom. The Miller Test is now the most prominent, also 
establishing guidelines with three elements: “a) whether the average person applying 
contemporary community standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and c) whether the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.”15 Permanently abolishing the 
requirement that the First Amendment protects those with redeeming social value, the Supreme 
Court redefined the scope of First Amendment privilege. No longer would any work be deemed 
obscene for not having social value, as the First Amendment guarantees a bigger area of 
protection than before. Materials that would once be deemed obscene, “if they were preceded by 
a poetry reading or followed by the recitation of some moral, it is under the Miller test, the value 
of the entire work that is to be judged.”16 The Miller Test continues to be effective because of its 
subjectivity and ambiguity that forces it to be continually relevant and applicable. Central to 
Miller v. California (1973)’s ruling is the fact that “Neither Miller v. California nor its progeny 
settle the fundamental questions of whether government should, as a matter of policy, suppress 
the distribution of obscenity, and of whether such suppression is consistent with first amendment 
values. Nor have these cases resolved the question of what obscenity is. In fact, it shall be a 
primary thesis of this that the Miller rules are best understood as the basis of a system of 
obscenity definition in which the question of what is obscene (if not the question of what is not 
obscene) need never be definitively answered.”17 Subjectivity becomes strategic to follow along 
 




17 “Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California,” Harvard Law Review 
88, no. 8 (June 1975): 1839. 
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society’s evolving values. Had the sexual revolution not occur, the Supreme Court would tackle 
this case differently; however, because Americans demanded a change, the Supreme Court 
needed to adapt to that change. 
These changes included setting the Miller Test apart to cease activities concerning what 
became a serious national problem across the nation: child pornography. The Supreme Court 
drew a separation between obscenity and child pornography, and New York v. Ferber (1982) is 
the Supreme Court’s attempt to solve this widespread issue. Whether or not this was the Supreme 
Court’s reaction to the demands of society, the protection of minors is still as important since 
Roth v. United States (1957). Justice White delivered the majority opinion of the Court, asserting 
that, “The Miller standard, like all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene, does 
not reflect the State’s particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote 
the sexual exploitation of children. Thus, the question under the Miller test of whether a work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of the average person bears no connection to the 
issue of whether a child has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the 
work.”18 The Miller Test does not qualify for child pornography as it belongs to an entirely 
different class, and thus the First Amendment does not protect any form of child pornography. 
New York. Ferber (1982) is set apart but may still rely on the Miller test: “the test for child 
pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller, but may be compared 
to it for the purpose of clarity.”19  
These judicial rulings on obscenity answers the question that the Supreme Court’s pursuit 
in defining obscenity does, in fact, occur concurrently with the evolution of society. Societal 
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values as well as the sexual revolution manifested their heavy influence when Roth v. United 
States (1957) and Miller v. California (1973) are put into comparison. Using Roth v. United 
States (1957) to validate the claim that the Court and society work concurrently, “Here is a prime 
example of societal norms reflected in the cases brought before the judiciary. The 1940s and 
1950s, if nothing more reflected an era of conservatism with a high emphasis placed upon the 
sanctity of marriage and family life. Not surprisingly, in reflecting society’s attitudes and value 
system, the one case which addressed the issue of whether or not the material was in fact 
obscene, dealt with an assault on the aforementioned value system.”20 At the bottom line of this 
whole pursuit is society dictating the Supreme Court. Society constructs the changes around the 
definition of obscenity, and the Court merely reacts to it. The norm and culture within the 
American community was different at the time of Roth v. United States (1957) and Miller v. 
California (1973). For instance, “During the 1940s and 1950s, when societal views on sexuality 
were very conservative, the seminal obscenity case found the challenged material to be obscene. 
However in present day, where society’s views on sex and sexuality are arguably more liberal, 
one of the seminal obscenity cases found the challenged material not to be obscene.”21 Had 
Rosen v. United States (1896) reappeared in 1973, the Supreme Court would most likely not 
enact the same ruling as 1896, as the standards of the Court depended on the standards of the 
people. In the same way, had Miller v. California (1973) appeared in 1896, the Supreme Court 
would most likely not establish the same legal parameters. What this means for the American 
society as a whole then, is “that as society’s values have evolved, so too has the subject matter of 
obscenity cases put before the judiciary, as is seen with the cases in the present day. As with the 
 
20 Mitchell., 506. 
 
21 Ibid., 509. 
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cases brought before the judiciary in the 1940s and 1950s, the subject matter of the cases in the 
2000s evidenced the dramatic changes of society’s views on sex and sexuality.”22 Societal values 
is the single largest contributing factor to the definition changes regarding obscenity. As long as 
society keeps evolving, so will the Court’s standards. Behind this pursuit is the Supreme Court 
and the American people working hand-in-hand to define obscenity together. 
The leading push towards the evolving values and morality stemmed from the 
introduction of the sexual revolution in the 1960s, which dramatically changed both society and 
its values as well as the Supreme Court. The beliefs behind the sexual revolution that gave rise to 
a new mindset provide explanation to why Supreme Court rulings after Roth v. United States 
(1957) leaned more liberal. Historians John D’Emilio and Estelle Freedman named the 
revolution in specific sexual liberalism–a change that “encompassed a great variety of ideas and 
behaviors,but at its heart it involved the modernizing of Victorian norms, generally within such 
existing structures as marriage and heterosexuality. Thus, marital sexual pleasure, and even some 
premarital sexual experimentation, became increasingly acceptable, aided by the sexualized 
consumer culture and its accompanying advertising industry sprouting at the time.”23 Concurrent 
with this new mentality is a twentieth-century sex scandal involving Evelyn Nesbit, who 
subsequent to the scandal pushed for a new portrayal and acceptance of female sexuality. Taking 
advantage of her fame, Nesbit delved into the entertainment industry as an actress who 
symbolized the current societal culture. Nesbit’s career highlights the fact that “while endless 
press coverage of sensationalized scandal was nothing new, the frank discussion of pre and 
extramarital sex showed a society publicly acknowledging and negotiating the tenuous 
 
22 Ibid., 507-508. 
 
23 Whitney Strub, Obscenity Rules: Roth v. United States and the Long Struggle over Sexual Expression 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013), 41. 
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boundaries of acceptable sexual behavior, adjusting to the rising awareness that Victorian norms 
failed to dictate urban modes of living.”24 To summarize how heavy the sexual revolution 
influenced Supreme Court cases, the Court established in Roth v. United States (1957) that the 
First Amendment does not protect areas of obscenity; in Stanley v. Georgia (1969) that the First 
Amendment prohibits government’s interference in a citizen’s private pursuit of obscene 
materials; in Miller v. California (1973), that the First Amendment protects obscene materials if 
the work is taken as a whole. Each new case that surfaced to the Supreme Court demonstrated a 
First Amendment progression.  
Women’s rights for a zone of privacy–especially the access to contraceptives–became the 
focal point of the sexual revolution. The social pushback against the Comstock Act of 1873 
which prohibited the spread of information about birth control and abortion spawned this new era 
of modern sexuality and activists. Margaret Sanger saw the frequency of women “trapped in 
cycles of unwanted pregnancies and unsafe, illegal abortions” commenting in her book that 
[Comstock’s] neurotic nature and savage methods of attack had ruined thousands of women’s 
lives.”25 The drive for women’s right to birth control culminated in a judicial manifestation of a 
modern sexuality mindset. Behind Stanley v. Georgia (1969) and Miller v. California (1973) is a 
collective group of Americans demanding a zone of privacy, or in other means, a right to 
personal autonomy. Fulfilling this demand is also the Supreme Court citing among many of the 
constitutional rights, the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and the penumbra of the 
Bill of Rights, specifically in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and later reaffirmed in Roe v. Wade 
(1972). This zone of privacy justified Justice Marshall’s consent in Stanley v. Georgia (1969) to 
 
24 Ibid., 39. 
 
25 Ibid., 41. 
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let a man possess or view obscene materials in his own home. The desire for a zone of privacy 
derived from seeing birth control as fundamental to women’s lives, as “the Pill was a great 
‘enabler.’ With The Pill, large numbers of college women could embark on careers that involved 
long term, up-front time commitments in education and training as physicians, lawyers, 
veterinarians, managers, and academics, among others.”26 Without access to contraception, 
women had no power to regulate pregnancies and the dream of pursuing a career became limited. 
Sanger believed that a “woman’s power can only be expressed and make itself felt when she 
refuses the task of bringing unwanted children into the world to be exploited in industry and 
slaughtered in wars.”27 Women’s right meant refusing to bear children, in part for the avoidance 
of child labor and child pornography as well as to pursue their careers. The sexual revolution 
rested around women “further assert[ing] her power by refusing to remain the passive instrument 
of sensual self-gratification on the part of men.”28 In essence, the sexual revolution is women’s 
collective action, voicing their rights to a career instead of simply motherhood. According to 
Margaret Sanger herself, birth control pills are the lesser evil to abortion; as “birth control has 
always been practiced, beginning with infanticide, which is abhorred, and then by abortion, 
nearly as bad. Contraception, on the other hand, is harmless.”29 The liberal attitudes of the 
Supreme Court that developed out of the sexual revolution did in a way support women’s rights. 
 
26 Robert H. Frank, “The Sexual Revolution Revisited,” in Under the Influence: Putting Peer Pressure to 
Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), 82-83. 
 
27 Margaret Sanger, “The Need for Birth Control (1922),” in For the Record: A Documentary History of 




29 Ingrid Mundt, “Margaret Sanger, Taking a Stand for Birth Control,” The History Teacher 51, no.1 (Nov 
2017): 125. 
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Government’s reduction of prohibition increased in concurrence with the society’s growing 
acceptance of sexuality. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the sexual revolution emphasized the need for birth control 
among women, many historians also argue that what marked the sexual revolution significant 
was not the pills, but rather, society’s new way of thinking about sex. In reality, “Many of the 
behaviors predisposed by the pill were already common, albeit covert, features of American life 
once the pill became available. The pill added fuel to a smoldering fire; it didn’t start the blaze, 
but it certainly accelerated it and ensured its spread.”30 The buildup to the sexual revolution in 
the 1950s included the use of birth control pills, though it might not have been as widespread. 
Meaning that at the time the Supreme Court heard Roth v. United States (1957), the 
acknowledgment of birth control pills as a necessity and the liberal attitudes on sexuality had 
already existed. Thus if the pinnacle of the sexual revolution did not escalate on birth control 
pills, it escalated on society’s progress towards a liberal mindset and attitudes; and, “a far more 
important predictor of the frequency with which people engaged in premarital sex in any era was 
the degree to which people believed that it was socially acceptable to do so. And in circular 
fashion, the degree to which people held that belief was itself strongly dependent on the 
proportion of people who were engaging in premarital sex. That proportion, in turn, was the 
result of many forces besides the pill.”31 Women found birth control pills necessary to their lives 
as it allowed them to either escape or put off motherhood, and for this reason, birth control pills 
will always bear significance. Historian Elaine Tyler May emphasized that it was not 
pharmaceutical agents that brought changes to societal values. “‘Pharmaceutical products have a 
 
30 Frank., 81. 
 
31 Ibid., 83. 
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huge impact, but they’re not causal agents,’ May wrote. ‘Sexual behaviors change more as a 
result of social changes than any kind of technological changes.’”32 Just as societal values 
impacted the Supreme Court’s rulings on obscenity cases, these same values also spawned the 
sexual revolution with birth control a part of it. The advancement in technology undoubtedly 
impacted societal values on sex, but these technology innovations did not cause the social 
pushback against the Comstock Act or the social acceptance of premarital and extramarital sex. 
Sociologist David John Frank reiterated this, stating that “How we think about sex matters a 
great deal, of course, and technological innovations also played an important, if indirect, role in 
how we think about sex.”33 The combination of technological advancement as well as society’s 
modern mindset together brought upon the sexual revolution and the liberal attitudes of the 
Court. Nevertheless, only after the revolution, did “the days of women being creatures of the 
home had all but dissipated with more than thirty million women in the workforce in 1990, and 
nearly 20% women having obtained a bachelor’s degree or higher.”34  
Beyond the walls of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction on obscenity cases lies a 
transformation of American values and norms. The ambiguity in defining the parameters of 
obscenity takes root in a society that is constantly evolving. Rosen v. United States (1896) 
presented a society where public discussion of sex was nonexistent; the only reasonable decision 
then for the Supreme Court was to rule the challenged materials brought before them as obscene, 
while also prohibiting the shipment of obscene materials. However, by the time Miller v. 
California (1973) emerged before the Supreme Court, the spark of the sexual revolution had 
 




34 Mitchell., 503. 
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gone by for a decade. The focus of the sexual revolution itself ought not to be on birth control 
pills, though they carried the potential and thus the significance to change the course of a 
woman’s life; but on the fact that society warmed up to the same beliefs that past communities 
would have deemed obscene, such as during the time Rosen v. United States (1896) emerged in 
Court. Certainly, technological advancements impacted how society approached beliefs and 
ideas, but the judicial manifestation of liberal rulings solely came from societal values itself. As 
society evolved its way of thinking, so did the subject matter within obscenity cases brought 
before the judiciary; no longer did the Supreme Court take on cases to decide whether the 
challenged material was obscene. The challenge of the Supreme Court consisted of finding the 
arguments to which obscene materials had First Amendment protection and why. Since the 
sexual revolution, the Supreme Court mainly focused on constitutional rights, whether it was 
First Amendment freedom of expression or zone of privacy for women’s abortion. Regardless, 
societal values dictated the Supreme Court’s rulings, creating a subjective definition of obscenity 
to meet the demands of society. 
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